The Climate Racket: From Petrodollar to Carbon Dollar
An Essay on Climate Governance, Dollar Hegemony, and the Infrastructure of Control
UNBEKOMING
In January 2026, the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Pentagon began purging references to climate change from its planning documents. Bill Gates, who had spent years positioning himself as climate philanthropy’s leading voice, publicly pivoted away from catastrophism, acknowledging that his earlier predictions had been overblown.
These developments followed a July 2025 report commissioned by Energy Secretary Christopher Wright—authored by climate scientists John Christy, Judith Curry, Steven Koonin, Ross McKitrick, and Roy Spencer—which concluded that U.S. climate policy actions “are expected to have undetectably small direct impacts on the global climate and any effects will emerge only with long delays.” Secretary Wright’s foreword to the report stated directly: “Climate change is a challenge—not a catastrophe. But misguided policies based on fear rather than facts could truly endanger human well-being.” He identified “global energy poverty,” not climate change, as “the greatest threat facing humanity.”
The report documented what it termed a systematic drift between science and public narrative. “Media coverage often distorts the science,” Wright wrote. “Many people walk away with a view of climate change that is exaggerated or incomplete.” The scientists he commissioned found that climate models consistently over-predict warming compared to observations, that carbon dioxide produces measurable benefits including enhanced agricultural productivity and global greening, and that the extreme scenarios driving policy—particularly the RCP8.5 pathway—rest on implausible assumptions about future emissions.
Thirty years of institutional consensus began cracking in months. The question this raises is not primarily about the validity of climate science. The question is: what was this apparatus actually for?
Denis Rancourt, a former University of Ottawa physics professor and researcher with the Ontario Civil Liberties Association, offers an answer that reframes the entire debate. In his 2019 report “Geo-Economics and Geo-Politics Drive Successive Eras of Predatory Globalization and Social Engineering,” and in subsequent analysis through 2026, Rancourt argues that climate policy functions as a protection racket—a system in which the state defines or exaggerates a threat, then extracts payment for “protection” from that threat, with funds flowing to connected players while the threat never resolves because resolution would end the extraction.
This framing shifts attention from temperature records and climate models to institutional history, funding flows, and geopolitical timing. It asks who built this apparatus, when, and why. Swedish researcher Jacob Nordangård has traced these questions through decades of foundation documents in his book Rockefeller: Controlling the Game, providing what he calls the institutional genealogy of climate governance. Paul Cudenec, writing through the Winter Oak platform, has documented the connections between banking dynasties and the climate finance architecture, tracing specific institutional links through primary sources. The answers these researchers document are not speculation—they draw on the Rockefeller Brothers Fund’s own program reviews, disclosed foundation strategies, and the correspondence of key participants. What emerges is not a conspiracy theory but traceable institutional history, largely hiding in plain sight.
The Protection Racket
A protection racket operates through a simple mechanism. An organization defines a threat, positions itself as the sole provider of protection from that threat, and extracts ongoing payment. The threat may be real, exaggerated, or entirely fabricated—what matters is that the target population believes in it and that the threat never fully resolves. Resolution would end the revenue stream.
The Club of Rome, a globalist think tank co-founded in 1968, provided what Kerry Bolton, in Revolution From Above, treats as a revealing admission in its 1991 report The First Global Revolution, issued just before the 1992 Earth Summit: “In searching for a common enemy against whom we can unite, we came up with the idea that pollution, the threat of global warming, water shortages, famine and the like, would fit the bill.” The threat was selected for its utility in justifying global governance—a “common enemy” requiring coordinated international response.
Rancourt argues that climate policy fits the protection racket pattern with precision. The threat is defined by state-aligned institutions: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assesses the science, the UNFCCC sets the policy framework, and national governments implement the extraction. Carbon taxes, emissions trading schemes, green bonds, and public “investments” in renewable energy transfer wealth from general populations to specific beneficiaries—green finance institutions, connected corporations, and the bureaucratic apparatus itself. The threat is structured to be unfalsifiable and perpetual. No matter what the climate does, the models can be adjusted, the goalposts moved, the timeline extended. Those who question the arrangement are treated not as scientific opponents deserving of engagement but as heretics requiring suppression.
The religious quality of climate discourse is not incidental. Rancourt characterizes it as a “powerful state-religion that has siloed concern and individual emotional investment away from the violence of globalization and class exploitation.” Climate guilt serves to “appease the consciences of the professional-class collaborators, and of middle-class individuals who are vulnerable to privilege-guilt.” The framework redirects attention from immediate, tangible harms—deindustrialization, wage stagnation, community destruction—toward a diffuse global danger for which everyone, and therefore no one, is responsible. Individual action becomes a ritual of absolution: recycling, carbon offsetting, electric vehicles. Collective action becomes impossible because the threat is everywhere and nowhere, caused by existence itself rather than by identifiable actors making identifiable choices.
The timing of climate concern’s emergence as a dominant policy framework is the first anomaly. The physics of carbon dioxide’s radiative properties were understood in the nineteenth century. Climate models predicting warming from CO2 increases existed by the 1960s. In 1967, leading theoretical climatologists Manabe and Wetherald calculated a 2 degree Celsius increase from doubling atmospheric CO2—and, as Rancourt notes, “no one batted an eye. The media was silent.” James Hansen’s famous congressional testimony occurred in 1988. Yet the institutional explosion—the creation of the UNFCCC, the regularization of IPCC assessments, the redirection of scientific funding, the transformation of environmental NGOs into climate advocacy organizations—occurred in 1991 and 1992.
Rancourt documents this timing through Google Scholar data. Research articles containing “global warming” or “climate change” remained essentially flat through the 1980s, then surged dramatically beginning in 1991. No atmospheric event triggered this surge. Carbon dioxide concentrations rose steadily throughout the century, not in a sudden spike. Temperature records showed no discontinuity. The atmospheric CO2 concentration graph from Mauna Loa Observatory shows a smooth curve with no inflection point around 1991. The trigger was not atmospheric but geopolitical: the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
The Post-Soviet Vacuum
The Cold War provided Western governing structures with a comprehensive framework for social organization. The Soviet threat justified military expenditure, intelligence apparatus expansion, domestic surveillance, and ideological conformity. It explained sacrifice, motivated compliance, and provided coherent meaning. The enemy was identifiable, the stakes were clear, and the required response was institutionally convenient—continuous weapons procurement, alliance maintenance, and population management through shared purpose.
December 1991 removed this framework overnight. Western elites faced a structural problem: how to maintain extraction systems and population management mechanisms without the enemy that had justified them for forty-five years.
The scale of the post-Soviet transformation is visible in financial data. The Bank for International Settlements documented that external financial assets and liabilities “soared, from around 36% of GDP in 1960 to around 400% ($293 trillion) in 2015.” This expansion concentrated in the mid-1990s, immediately following Soviet dissolution. The United States, which had maintained positive net international investment positions throughout the Cold War, swung to massive negative positions—becoming the world’s largest debtor nation precisely as it declared itself the sole superpower. Merger activity exploded in what financial historians term the “fifth wave of mergers (1993-2000),” during which “companies of unprecedented size and global sweep were created.”
Rancourt interprets this pattern as predatory globalization—”a euphemism for Western USA-led economic predation”—unleashed by the removal of the Soviet counterweight. The circumstances that should have produced international cooperation and shared development instead produced “a USA rampage for unrestricted exploitation of and dominance over formerly protected regions.” Wars proliferated: the Gulf War, wars to “prevent genocide,” NATO expansion, the war on terror, wars to bring “democracy” and “human rights.” The connecting thread was not the stated humanitarian purpose but the enforcement of dollar hegemony and access to resources.
Rancourt identifies three generic ideologies that were seeded through United Nations frameworks almost immediately after the Soviet collapse: climate change, gender equity, and anti-racism as language control. All three share structural characteristics that make them useful for governance. They are unfalsifiable—no achievable condition would satisfy the demand. They induce guilt in target populations, particularly the professional and middle classes who are most susceptible to ideological compliance. They require permanent institutional management, ensuring ongoing employment for a bureaucratic administrative class. They justify surveillance and control as necessary responses to the identified threat. And they can be deployed flexibly against geopolitical opponents—vilifying nations because “they supposedly pollute, have large populations, reject gender fluidity, have their own state religions, and so on.”
Climate change serves additional functions beyond these generic properties. It enables direct money extraction through mechanisms that can be presented as market-based rather than as taxation. Carbon taxes, cap-and-trade schemes, and green bonds all transfer wealth while maintaining the appearance of voluntary or market-mediated exchange. Climate concern justifies surveillance—carbon footprint tracking requires monitoring of consumption, travel, and behavior. The framing of emissions as the problem implicitly identifies population itself as a threat, providing ideological cover for population management policies. And when disasters occur—floods, droughts, fires—climate attribution provides a ready explanation that deflects attention from infrastructure failures, policy choices, and corporate negligence. Rancourt notes the pattern of “dismantling or incapacitating water management facilities supposedly in the goal of environmental restoration and then blaming resulting floods on climate change.”
The mid-2000s transition in climate concern—visible across academic publication, media coverage, and legislative initiatives—was driven, Rancourt argues, by “global financiers, based in the USA and connected to the Democratic Party.” These finance leaders possess “considerable sway, directly and indirectly, in the editorial policies of the major news media.” The scientists followed the funding and popularity trend. Wall Street investment banks like Lehman Brothers established climate-focused divisions; as Newsweek noted in 2007, “the way to get the green is to go green.” A new global commodity—carbon—traded in U.S. dollars under U.S. control of global financial institutions, became one more instrument alongside oil, military hardware, and debt to secure the dollar’s position as world currency.
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit formalized the institutional architecture within months of Soviet dissolution. The UNFCCC established the treaty framework. Agenda 21 outlined the implementation structure. The apparatus that would grow over the following three decades was seeded in this concentrated moment of post-Cold War reorganization. The timing was not coincidental. The apparatus filled the vacuum that Soviet collapse had created.
Who Built It
The institutional machinery deployed in 1991-1992 was not improvised. Its components had been constructed over decades by identifiable actors whose records are available in their own archives.
Jacob Nordangård, a Swedish researcher, has traced what he terms the “Rockefeller climate game” through foundation documents, grant records, and the correspondence of key participants. The pattern he documents begins in the 1950s, accelerates through the 1970s and 1980s, and culminates in the apparatus that emerged at Rio.
The Rockefeller Foundation began funding climate research in the 1950s at institutions that would become central nodes in the later network. Nordangård’s research documents that the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, which would later become notorious for the “Climategate” emails, received Rockefeller funding. The Beijer Institute in Stockholm, which served as a key connection point between scientific research and policy formation, operated within the Rockefeller orbit. These early investments created institutional relationships and shaped research agendas long before climate became a public policy concern.
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund launched its environmental program in 1974 and began systematic climate grantmaking in 1984. The fund’s own program reviews, published retrospectively, describe what they term “Phase One” of their climate strategy, running from 1984 to 1992. The explicit goals, stated in their own documents, were “establishing ongoing mechanisms for distilling scientific consensus on climate change” and “moving the discussion of global warming from the scientific community into the broader policy arena.”
Their strategy, as documented in these reviews, operated through several channels. Direct grants supported research at key institutions. Funding flowed to “allied voices” in business, religious organizations, and youth constituencies to create the appearance of broad-based concern. “Well-placed NGOs” were cultivated to play what the fund’s advisors called a “behind-the-scenes role” in shaping policy. The grant records show specific amounts flowing to specific organizations to accomplish specific objectives. In 2001 alone, RBF funded ten environmental groups working on climate-related projects. The Greenpeace Fund received $75,000 for their Global Warming Campaign, whose purpose was to lobby the 100 largest companies to work together “in the battle against climate change.”
The Rio Summit and the creation of the IPCC—presented to the public as responses to emerging scientific consensus—were outcomes that the Rockefeller Brothers Fund explicitly claims credit for facilitating. Michael Oppenheimer, who would become a lead author on IPCC reports, was funded as an Environmental Defense Fund scientist through RBF grants. The fund’s retrospective assessment states that its Phase One investment of under one million dollars “fostered the creation of the global warming issue,” shaped the scientific consensus process, and moved the issue “to the highest levels of government.”
The personnel connections reinforce the institutional ones. Bert Bolin, the Swedish meteorologist who became the first chairman of the IPCC, operated within networks that received Rockefeller funding. Gordon Goodman at the Beijer Institute advised the RBF on strategy and personnel. George H.W. Bush, who presided over U.S. participation in the Rio Summit and the initial UNFCCC signing, was a member of the Trilateral Commission and maintained what David Rockefeller’s memoirs describe as a “friend and advisor” relationship with the family.
The coordinating institution linking these networks is the Council on Foreign Relations. Richard Cook, drawing on Carroll Quigley’s research into elite archives, documents the CFR’s origins: joint meetings between British and American diplomats at the Hotel Majestic in Paris in May 1919, just before signing the Treaty of Versailles. The British established the Royal Institute of International Affairs, closely aligned with Cecil Rhodes’s Round Table movement and its goal of binding American power to British strategic objectives. Americans created a parallel institution—the Council on Foreign Relations, legally chartered in 1921, funded by “the thousand richest Americans,” with the Rockefeller fortune instrumental in its operations throughout its history. The CFR functions as what Cook terms “the premier instrument of American international financial control,” articulating elite consensus on foreign policy and supplying personnel to successive administrations regardless of party. Within two weeks of Germany’s 1939 invasion of Poland, Council representatives met with the State Department to offer planning for postwar American dominance. Their War and Peace Studies project—funded entirely by the Rockefeller Foundation—sent 682 memoranda to government policymakers, concluding that the war was a “grand opportunity” for the United States to become “the premier power in the world.”
Future CIA director Allen Dulles led the project’s Armaments Group. This private organization, with no official government standing, defined America’s wartime objectives and postwar global posture. The pattern has continued through climate governance: Council members populate every administration’s foreign policy apparatus, ensuring continuity of the globalist agenda.
After the turn of the millennium, the network expanded further. In 2004, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund established The Climate Group in London, which began engaging large corporations and local authorities to implement climate measures “that favoured continued economic growth.” The fund’s strategy documents describe this as essential: “The business community is a critical voice for countering the oft-heard argument that policy regulating carbon dioxide will harm the U.S. economy. Forward-thinking business leaders have been quite vocal about the opportunities associated with the new energy economy.”
The environmental movement itself required transformation to serve the climate agenda. Green organizations in the 1970s and early 1980s were often skeptical of the CO2 warming thesis, which had been promoted by nuclear power advocates as an argument against fossil fuels. The movement’s base was concerned with pollution, wilderness preservation, and corporate accountability—not with atmospheric chemistry. Funding from the Rockefeller, Ford, and MacArthur foundations changed this orientation. Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the Climate Action Network, and dozens of smaller organizations received grants tied to climate work. The RBF documents describe an explicit strategy of funding these groups to create constituencies for climate policy.
The manufactured quality of recent climate activism is also documented in research compiled by Paul Cudenec. Canadian investigative journalist Cory Morningstar traced Greta Thunberg’s rise to prominence, finding that on the first day of her Stockholm pavement protest in August 2018, communications specialist Callum Grieve—who had worked five years for The Climate Group—sent her a Twitter message: “We’re right behind you.” Ingmar Rentzhog, the PR professional who photographed Thunberg and tweeted about her protest, later admitted he had done PR work for her mother and been “tipped off” about the protest in advance. Extinction Rebellion’s XR Business was launched with a letter signed by figures including Paul Polman, former Unilever CEO and Rockefeller Foundation trustee. In Italy, Ultima Generazione is funded by the A22 network, itself funded by the Climate Emergency Fund in the USA—co-founded by billionaire Aileen Getty of the Getty oil dynasty.
The institutional architecture was pre-positioned. The scientific networks were funded and shaped. The NGO landscape was prepared. The policy frameworks were drafted. The activism was staged. What was needed was an activation moment—a geopolitical opening that would allow this machinery to be deployed at scale. The Soviet collapse provided it.
The Banking Foundation
Understanding why such elaborate institutional structures are built requires examining the monetary system within which they operate. As Justin Ptak recently observed in a Mises Wire analysis: “Money is the hidden constitution of every political order. It determines which actions are possible, which institutions survive, which risks are rewarded, and which failures are forgiven.” Stephen Mitford Goodson, a former director of the South African Reserve Bank, traced this history in A History of Central Banking and the Enslavement of Mankind, documenting how the structure of modern money creation generates requirements that political arrangements must satisfy.
The central mechanism, as Goodson documented, is this: in contemporary monetary systems, money is created primarily by private banks as interest-bearing debt. When a bank issues a loan, it creates new money—the loan amount is credited to the borrower’s account, expanding the money supply. But the borrower must repay the principal plus interest. Since the interest was never created, aggregate debt in the system always exceeds the money available to repay it. The system requires perpetual debt expansion simply to service existing obligations. If debt stops growing, the mathematics of interest payments force defaults, contractions, and crises.
This structure inverts the logic of market discipline. Ptak’s analysis is precise: “Under central banking, profits remain private during credit-fueled expansions, while losses are declared systemic during contractions and transferred to the public through bailouts, inflation, and monetary debasement.” Risk-taking is rewarded precisely because it is underwritten; prudence is punished through negative real interest rates and competitive disadvantage. What presents itself as capitalism is, in practice, state-protected finance sustained by political necessity rather than economic viability.
This structure has characterized Western banking since the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 and was institutionalized in the United States through the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Richard Cook, a former Treasury Department analyst, documented how this institution emerged from deliberate conspiracy rather than legislative deliberation. In November 1910, Senator Nelson Aldrich—whose daughter had married John D. Rockefeller Jr.—convened representatives of the Morgan, Rockefeller, and Kuhn Loeb banking interests at a secret meeting on Jekyll Island, Georgia. The participants traveled under assumed names and maintained secrecy for years afterward. Present were Aldrich, assistant treasury secretary A. Piatt Andrew, Morgan bankers Henry Davison and Arthur Shelton, Rockefeller’s National City Bank president Frank Vanderlip, and German émigré Paul Warburg of Kuhn Loeb, who maintained powerful Rothschild connections. Their product gave private bankers control over currency creation while providing a “lender of last resort” when speculation produced crashes. The Federal Reserve Act passed Congress in December 1913—a surrender of Constitutional authority over the nation’s monetary system. Congress had the power “to coin money, regulate the value thereof,” but delegated that power to a system of regional banks controlled by private banking interests.
The consequences are measurable. Since the Federal Reserve’s creation, the U.S. dollar has lost approximately 97 percent of its purchasing power. The national debt has grown from $2.65 billion to over $20 trillion. These are not policy failures but structural outcomes of debt-money creation.
The manipulation of interest rates lies at the heart of this system. In classical theory, interest rates coordinate time preferences across society, balancing present consumption against future uncertainty. They are prices, emerging from the interaction of savers and borrowers. In modern fiat systems, interest rates are no longer prices at all. They are policy signals, imposed to achieve macroeconomic targets defined by central planners. This substitution of administrative judgment for market coordination creates what Ptak terms a “monetary hierarchy”—those closest to the source of money creation enjoy the lowest borrowing costs, while costs rise as one moves further from the issuance point. Proximity to money creation becomes a determinant of survival. Access replaces productivity as the primary economic advantage.
The Bank for International Settlements, established in 1930 and serving as the coordinating body for central banks globally, manages this system at the international level. Carroll Quigley, the Georgetown historian who had access to the archives of key financial institutions, wrote in Tragedy and Hope that the BIS was part of a plan to create “a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole.”
The consequences extend beyond national borders. Because the U.S. dollar functions as the world’s reserve currency, Federal Reserve policy becomes global monetary policy by default. Foreign states must hold dollars to stabilize trade, borrow in dollars to access capital, and absorb the consequences of U.S. monetary decisions over which they have no control. When the Fed eases, capital floods into emerging markets, inflating bubbles and encouraging dollar-denominated debt. When the Fed tightens, currencies collapse, debts become unpayable, and crises erupt. What appears as domestic stabilization at the center manifests as devastation at the periphery. Ptak describes this arrangement as “seigniorage imperialism”—the issuing state acquires real goods, labor, and assets in exchange for liabilities it can expand at will.
The growth imperative embedded in debt-money creates specific political requirements. New debt instruments must be continuously developed to absorb the expanding money supply. New justifications must be provided for public borrowing, since sovereign debt is a primary asset class. New markets for financial speculation must be opened to generate returns for accumulated capital. Climate policy delivers all three requirements.
Green bonds constitute a new debt instrument class that has grown from negligible issuance to hundreds of billions annually. Carbon credits create tradeable assets from regulatory frameworks, generating new markets denominated in dollars and subject to financial engineering. The “climate emergency” provides unlimited justification for public spending—infrastructure transformation, energy system replacement, adaptation measures, international transfers—all financed through debt that enters the system as money and exits as interest payments to financial institutions.
The institutional connections between banking dynasties and climate finance architecture are documented in research compiled from primary sources. Paul Cudenec, writing through the Winter Oak platform, has traced specific links. Edmond de Rothschild was the key figure behind the World Conservation Bank, proposed in 1987 and established under World Bank auspices in 1991 as the Global Environment Facility. The GEF has since disbursed tens of billions of dollars and serves as the funding mechanism for five UN conventions, including the UNFCCC. The timing of its creation—contemporaneous with the Soviet collapse and the Rio Summit—places it precisely within the infrastructure build-out that Nordangård documents.
The architecture was made explicit in a 2008 policy document by Simon Linnett, Executive Vice Chairman of N M Rothschild London. In Trading Emissions: Full Global Potential, published through The Social Market Foundation, Linnett proposed that carbon trading should function as “a new form of social market” with carbon credits operating as a speculative global reserve currency. An “international institution” with a constitution would be required to regulate carbon emissions globally—Linnett suggested calling it the “World Environment Authority,” to be based in a “world city” such as London. His conclusion: “Nations have to be prepared to subordinate, to a certain extent, some of their sovereignty to this world initiative… If such a route map could be found, then perhaps we might be at the beginning of a new world constitution and a new world order.” A Rothschild executive, publishing through a policy foundation, explicitly outlined how climate governance would function as the architecture for sovereignty transfer.
The personnel who built the apparatus confirm these connections. Maurice Strong—described by the New York Times as “the Custodian of the Planet”—served as Secretary General of the 1992 Earth Summit that issued Agenda 21, first director of the UN Environment Program, senior advisor to the World Bank president, and member of the Commission on Global Governance. He was also one of nine directors of the Chicago Climate Exchange, the only carbon trading exchange in North America. Strong told Maclean’s magazine in 1976 that he was “a socialist in ideology, a capitalist in methodology”—a formulation Bolton treats as encapsulating the synthesis of state planning and financial extraction that climate governance represents. Strong’s career trajectory—from oil industry in the 1950s to heading Petro-Canada in the 1970s to chairing the Earth Summit in 1992—illustrates the revolving door between fossil fuels, government, and environmental governance.
The contemporary expression of this connection runs through BlackRock and the ESG compliance system. Rothschild Australia Asset Management appointed BlackRock to manage its global fixed interest portfolios in 2002. Rothschild & Co has advised on multiple BlackRock deals subsequently. In 2023, BlackRock and JPMorgan Chase—identified in historical research as operating within the Rothschild financial network—collaborated on helping the Ukrainian government establish a reconstruction bank, channeling post-conflict development through familiar institutional pathways. ESG compliance—environmental, social, and governance scoring that determines access to capital—functions as what researchers have termed “a control mechanism” directing investment toward compliant entities and away from those that resist. The $1.164 trillion impact investment market, coordinated through UN Development Programme steering groups, creates what its architects describe as “monetization of future cost savings”—financial returns generated by financing mandated solutions to defined problems.
Al Gore’s post-Vice Presidency ventures illustrate how climate advocacy and financial extraction converge at the individual level. In 2004, Gore co-founded Generation Investment Management with David Blood, former CEO of Goldman Sachs Asset Management. Bolton documents that the firm’s partners include seven from Goldman Sachs, plus representatives from Morgan Stanley, Rothschild Asset Management, and other major financial institutions. The firm’s stated purpose—”sustainable capitalism”—promises investors that “these global challenges pose risks and opportunities that can materially affect a company’s ability to sustain profitability and deliver returns.” The climate crisis becomes an investment thesis.
Climate finance is not a byproduct of climate concern. Climate concern is the ideological justification for climate finance. The extraction apparatus required the threat narrative to legitimate it.
From Petrodollar to Carbon Dollar
The climate finance architecture becomes fully legible only when understood as a second pillar of dollar hegemony, constructed to complement and eventually extend the petrodollar system.
When Nixon closed the gold window in August 1971, ending international convertibility of dollars to gold, the currency lost its anchor. The dollar’s value and status as global reserve currency required a new foundation. Henry Kissinger negotiated the solution with Saudi Arabia: oil would be priced exclusively in dollars, and Saudi petroleum revenues would be recycled into U.S. Treasury bonds. Other OPEC nations followed. Any country wishing to purchase oil—the essential commodity of industrial civilization—would first need to acquire dollars, creating permanent global demand for American currency regardless of U.S. fiscal or trade deficits.
The petrodollar system worked for decades, but it contained a structural vulnerability: it depended on a single commodity controlled by nations whose interests would not align with American objectives forever. A second dollar-anchoring system—one based on a commodity that could be created through regulatory fiat rather than extracted from foreign territory—would provide redundancy and extend dollar hegemony into domains oil could not reach.
Carbon serves this function. Rancourt identifies it directly: carbon is “one more commodity (with oil, opium, military hardware, and debt) to secure the US dollar as the world currency.” The Linnett document reveals this was not an emergent property but a design objective. A Rothschild executive explicitly proposed that carbon credits function as a “global reserve currency”—not metaphorically but literally, a second dollar-denominated commodity system alongside oil.
The parallels are structural:
The petrodollar requires nations to hold dollar reserves to participate in energy markets. Carbon trading requires nations to hold dollar-denominated carbon credits to participate in the global economy without penalty. The petrodollar is enforced through military power—Saddam Hussein announced Iraq would accept euros for oil and was overthrown; Gaddafi proposed a gold-backed African currency and was killed. Carbon compliance is enforced through regulatory and financial mechanisms—ESG scoring, access to capital markets, trade penalties, reputational sanctions. The stick is softer but the compliance architecture is more comprehensive, reaching into corporate governance, investment decisions, and individual behavior in ways military enforcement never could.
The timing reinforces the connection. The petrodollar emerged in the early 1970s after the gold standard’s collapse left the dollar unanchored. The carbon architecture emerged in the early 1990s after the Soviet collapse created both the geopolitical opening and the need for a new enemy to justify continued extraction. Two decades apart, two pillars of the same system: dollar hegemony maintained through control of essential commodities, one extracted from the earth, one created by regulation.
The carbon system offers advantages the petrodollar lacks. Oil reserves are finite and concentrated in regions America does not control. Carbon credits are unlimited—governments can create them by decree, and the supply expands with every new regulation. Oil extraction requires cooperation from producer nations who pursue independent policies. Carbon compliance can be imposed unilaterally through financial system access, trade policy, and regulatory harmonization. Oil anchors the dollar to energy; carbon anchors it to economic activity itself, since all production involves emissions.
The carbon dollar requires enforcement infrastructure the petrodollar never needed. Oil is physical—it moves through pipelines and tankers that can be monitored and interdicted. Carbon is abstract—compliance requires tracking emissions embedded in every product through every supply chain, then conditioning transactions on that data. This is not a technical problem to be solved later. It is being solved now.
The researcher known as ESC has documented the construction in real time. The Bank for International Settlements—the central bank of central banks—has deployed a series of innovation projects that build the conditional payment architecture carbon compliance requires. Project Rosalind, conducted with the Bank of England, demonstrated retail implementation through what the technology provider calls a “three-party lock”: identity (who are you?), asset (what are you buying?), and permission (do you have the allowance?). Funds lock; the system evaluates conditions across multiple dimensions; if conditions pass, funds release; if conditions fail, the transaction reverts. Project Mandala encodes jurisdiction-specific regulatory requirements into protocol, generating cryptographic proof of compliance before settlement proceeds. Project Agorá, launched in 2024 with seven central banks and forty-one major financial institutions including JPMorgan, Visa, and Swift, moves the unified ledger from blueprint to implementation. Findings are expected in the first half of 2026. BIS General Manager Agustín Carstens, co-authoring with the architect of India’s mandatory biometric ID system, called this infrastructure a “Neil Armstrong moment”—the transition from money as a bearer asset to conditional entries that clear only when parameters are satisfied.
The timeline is concrete: the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism became fully operational in early 2026. Digital Product Passports—QR codes or chips containing a product’s full carbon history—become mandatory for batteries in 2027. The EU Digital Identity Wallet becomes mandatory for banks and large platforms by 2027. The Digital Euro targets potential issuance by 2029. ESC identifies the convergence: “identity wallet + product passport + programmable payment = conditional commerce.”
Officials claim the Digital Euro “won’t be programmable money.” This is word games. The currency itself won’t have rules built in, but the wallets and payment applications that handle it can. The outcome is identical: if you don’t meet the conditions, the money doesn’t move. A Rothschild executive proposed carbon as a global reserve currency in 2008. By 2029, the infrastructure to enforce that proposal at the point of sale will be operational. ESC describes what this means at the checkout: “The system will soon know exactly how much carbon is in your shopping cart, and for the first time, it will have the power to say ‘no’ at the checkout.” No decree required. The transaction simply fails to clear.
ESC poses the question the architects avoid: “What happens to those who fail the conditions?” India’s Aadhaar system provides precedent. When biometric authentication fails—fingerprints worn from manual labor, iris scans degraded after cataract surgery—the system returns “no match” and benefits are denied. Santhoshi Kumari was eleven when her family’s ration card was cancelled for not linking to Aadhaar. She died from starvation. The database is never wrong. The child was simply not in the system. The architecture allows a future where every purchase is checked against your status, where economic freedom depends on meeting centrally-determined requirements, and where algorithms you’ve never voted on decide whether your transactions clear. The passenger sees weather—a declined card, a routing error, additional verification required. The operator sees a successful API callback. The cockpit sees a cleared dashboard.
Both systems now face pressure from the same source: de-dollarization. Russia, China, and the BRICS nations are constructing alternative payment systems, trading oil in rubles and yuan, and rejecting the climate compliance frameworks that would subordinate their development to Western financial institutions. The resistance to climate policy from these nations is not climate skepticism—it is refusal to accept a second dollar-anchoring mechanism after decades of suffering under the first. When Western officials denounce China’s coal plants or Russia’s emissions, they are demanding participation in a system designed to perpetuate dollar hegemony. The targets understand this even when Western populations do not.
The fracturing of the climate consensus and the acceleration of de-dollarization are the same phenomenon viewed from different angles. The system that anchored the dollar to oil is losing its grip as alternative payment systems emerge. The system designed to anchor the dollar to carbon is being rejected before it could fully consolidate. American financial hegemony—the foundation on which the entire extraction architecture rests—is under challenge on both fronts simultaneously.
The Scientific Question
The July 2025 Department of Energy report exposes the gap between what climate science supports and what the policy apparatus claims.
The report’s authors—John Christy, Judith Curry, Steven Koonin, Ross McKitrick, and Roy Spencer—are credentialed climate scientists with extensive publication records. Secretary Wright’s foreword emphasizes that he “exerted no control over their conclusions” and that the writing team “worked with full independence.” The report represents an internal challenge to climate orthodoxy from within the scientific establishment, commissioned by a cabinet-level official.
The core findings are stark. U.S. policy actions will have “undetectably small direct impacts on the global climate.” The report explains the physics: “Any change in local CO2 emissions today will have only a very small global effect, and only with a long delay.” Even aggressive emissions reductions would “only modestly slow, but not prevent, the rise of global CO2 concentration.” The entire policy apparatus is directed at achieving effects that the government’s own commissioned analysis describes as undetectable.
The report documents systematic problems in the climate modeling that underpins policy projections. Models consistently over-predict warming compared to observations, particularly in the tropical troposphere where greenhouse gas physics predicts the strongest warming signal should appear. The tropical troposphere is where the theory says the effect should be most visible. The persistent model-observation mismatch indicates structural problems with the models, not mere parameter uncertainty.
Carbon dioxide’s effects are not uniformly negative. The report documents “global greening”—satellite-observed increases in vegetation across most land areas since systematic observation began. CO2 is plant food; elevated concentrations enhance photosynthesis and improve crop water use efficiency. Agricultural productivity has increased substantially over the period of rising CO2. These documented benefits are rarely mentioned in policy discussions that treat CO2 exclusively as a pollutant.
Energy Secretary Wright’s framing: “Climate change is real, and it deserves attention. But it is not the greatest threat facing humanity. That distinction belongs to global energy poverty.” He continues: “Climate change is a challenge—not a catastrophe. But misguided policies based on fear rather than facts could truly endanger human well-being.”
A cabinet-level official, citing government-commissioned research, directly challenged the catastrophist framing that has justified the policy apparatus. The report calls for “a more nuanced and evidence-based approach” that “explicitly acknowledges uncertainties” and weighs climate risks “against the costs, efficacy, and collateral impacts of any ‘climate action.’”
The policy-science disconnect becomes explicable if the policy serves purposes other than climate mitigation. Trillions in spending, comprehensive economic restructuring, energy system transformation, and supranational governance arrangements make no sense as responses to a challenge that U.S. government-commissioned analysis describes as producing “undetectably small” effects from American policy action. They make complete sense as mechanisms for financial extraction, institutional expansion, and population management—the functions of a protection racket.
The Current Fracture
Rancourt’s 2026 analysis interprets the Trump administration’s withdrawal from climate frameworks not as a scientific reassessment but as a symptom of elite factional conflict. The climate apparatus served specific interests during a specific phase of American hegemonic management. That phase is ending.
The geopolitical context has shifted substantially since the early 1990s when the apparatus was activated. American hegemony, then at its zenith, now faces structural challenges. The rise of China as a manufacturing and technological power, Russia’s resistance to post-Soviet absorption, and the emergence of BRICS as an alternative economic coordination framework have created a multipolar environment that did not exist when climate policy was institutionalized. The unipolar moment that enabled unlimited dollar expansion and supranational governance construction has passed.
Rancourt draws on Yanis Varoufakis’s analysis of a split between what might be termed “Big Finance” and “Big Tech”—cloudalist versus traditional finance capital—competing for dominance within Western elite structures. Climate ideology served the globalist financial faction: it boosted the dollar through carbon markets denominated in U.S. currency, justified supranational governance that subordinated national sovereignty to international financial institutions, provided extraction mechanisms through debt instruments and compliance systems, and managed populations through guilt induction and surveillance justification.
But ideologies can outlive their usefulness to the factions that deployed them. Rancourt argues that climate ideology now “hinders the empire” in several ways. It has evolved toward what he terms “absurd endpoints”—policy proposals so extreme that they generate backlash rather than compliance. Net-zero mandates, internal combustion engine bans, heat pump requirements, and meat consumption restrictions have produced populist resistance across Western societies. The ideology constrains industrial development at precisely the moment when great power competition requires manufacturing capacity. It empowers international institutions at a moment when nationalist factions seek to reassert American unilateralism. And it provides rhetorical weapons to geopolitical opponents who can point to Western climate hypocrisy while pursuing their own development.
The “Great Reset” moment of 2020-2021, when climate-finance integration reached its peak ambition through pandemic-linked “Build Back Better” frameworks, represents the high-water mark rather than a new beginning. The convergence of climate emergency, pandemic emergency, and digital currency proposals into a single policy framework overreached. The apparent retreat from these frameworks—visible in the DOE report, the UNFCCC withdrawal, the Pentagon purge, and the broader political realignment—signals factional repositioning rather than popular victory.
Rancourt predicts that “the ideology-tied exploitation rackets most at risk immediately appear to be climate change and universal infant immunization, which extract huge rents from the Western public economy.” Other control mechanisms “will follow the same fate as the empire further recedes, as national sovereignties are recovered in many countries, and as the real economy of production and distribution becomes preeminent in most of the world.” This is not optimism about liberation but recognition of imperial decline.
The fracturing of climate consensus should not be mistaken for liberation from elite management. Different factions will deploy different extraction mechanisms. The infrastructure for digital currency, AI-mediated governance, and biosurveillance is already under construction. These systems will prove more comprehensive than the climate apparatus they partially displace. The protection racket does not end; it evolves.
Conclusion
The climate racket is not a conspiracy theory. It is documented institutional history.
The Rockefeller foundations’ own program reviews describe their strategy for creating the global warming issue and moving it to the highest levels of government. The funding flows from foundations to scientific institutions to NGOs to policy bodies are traceable through grant records. The timing correlates precisely with geopolitical events—not atmospheric ones. The policy outcomes serve financial interests that can be named: the debt instrument markets, the carbon trading systems, the green bond issuances, the compliance bureaucracies. The scientific justification is now officially contested by government-commissioned analysis stating that U.S. policy will have “undetectably small” climate effects.
This architecture matters beyond the climate debate.
The same institutional networks that built the climate apparatus are constructing the next systems. Digital currency frameworks promise to complete the monitoring of economic behavior that carbon tracking only partially achieved. AI governance proposals would delegate regulatory authority to systems that cannot be interrogated or held accountable. Biosurveillance infrastructure, expanded dramatically during the pandemic period, creates population management capabilities that dwarf anything the climate apparatus enabled.
ESC’s documentation of the conditional payment infrastructure reveals the deeper pattern: “What’s being built isn’t a climate system—it’s general-purpose eligibility infrastructure with climate as the current use case.” The three-party lock that checks carbon coefficients can check anything. Swap carbon for health status during a pandemic, information behavior during a “misinformation crisis,” or political reliability during an emergency, and the machinery works identically. The architecture is domain-agnostic. The rails don’t care what they carry. Climate provided the moral justification for building the infrastructure; the infrastructure will outlast the justification.
The pattern is consistent: threat definition, institutional capture, extraction, population management. The specific content of the threat—Soviet aggression, climate catastrophe, pandemic disease, artificial intelligence risk—matters less than the structure of the response. Each iteration builds infrastructure that persists after the specific threat narrative fades. Each iteration transfers wealth and consolidates control. Each iteration normalizes arrangements that would have been unthinkable a generation earlier.
Recognition of this pattern is the precondition for effective response. As long as each threat narrative is evaluated in isolation—Is climate change real? Was the pandemic natural? Is AI dangerous?—the structural continuity remains invisible. The question is never only whether the threat is genuine. The question is who defines the threat, who controls the response, who benefits from the extraction, and what infrastructure remains when the emergency passes.
Goodson documented that throughout recorded history, “periods of state control of the money supply have been synonymous with eras of prosperity, peace, cultural enrichment, full employment and zero inflation,” while private banker control has produced “recurring cycles of prosperity and poverty, unemployment, embedded inflation and an enormous and ever increasing transfer of wealth and political power to this tiny clique.” The climate apparatus is one expression of that transfer. Its fracture does not end the underlying dynamic; it opens space for whatever extraction mechanism comes next.
The climate apparatus is fracturing. The DOE report, the treaty withdrawals, the shifting elite positioning—this protection racket has entered a terminal phase. What replaces it will be built by the same institutional networks, using the same construction techniques, serving the same structural requirements of debt-money systems that must grow or collapse.
The choice is not between climate compliance and freedom. The choice is between understanding how these systems are built—and therefore how they might be resisted—and stumbling from one managed crisis to the next, perpetually surprised that the solutions never solve and the extractions never end.
How to Explain It to a 6 Year Old
Imagine you have a piggy bank. You put coins in, you take coins out. The coins are yours. When you want to buy a toy, you give the shopkeeper your coins, and you get the toy. Simple.
Now imagine some grownups said: “We’re in charge of everyone’s piggy banks now. When you want to buy something, you have to ask us first. We’ll check if you’ve been good. We’ll check if that toy is allowed. We’ll check if you’ve already bought too many toys this month. If we say yes, you can have your coins. If we say no, your coins stay locked up.”
You’d say: “But they’re MY coins!”
And the grownups would say: “Yes, but we’re protecting you. There’s a big scary problem—the air is getting too hot—and we need to check everything to fix it.”
That’s what this essay is about.
A long time ago, powerful people decided that everyone in the world had to use special American coins called dollars to buy oil—the black stuff that makes cars go. This made American coins very important. Everyone needed them.
Now those same powerful people want to create a second rule: everyone has to use their dollars to buy permission to make smoke and fumes. Factories make smoke. Cars make smoke. Even keeping your house warm makes smoke. If everything that makes smoke needs permission, then they can check everything you do.
They’re building a machine that watches what you buy. The machine checks: Who are you? What are you buying? Are you allowed? If any answer is wrong, your coins don’t work. The toy stays on the shelf. You don’t get the ice cream. Not because someone said “no”—the machine just doesn’t work for you.
The grownups building this machine say it’s to help the planet. But the essay shows that the same families and banks have been building control machines for over a hundred years. They build a machine, tell everyone it’s to fix a scary problem, and then the machine stays forever—even after people stop being scared.
The scary problem changes. The machine stays.
Right now, some people are fighting about whether the air is really getting too hot. But that’s not the main question. The main question is: should anyone build a machine that can lock your piggy bank if you don’t follow their rules?
Because once the machine exists, whoever controls it can change the rules to whatever they want.
References
The analysis in this essay draws substantially on the work of researchers I have interviewed: Denis Rancourt, Jacob Nordangård, Paul Cudenec, and ESC. Their original research and documentation should be consulted directly.
Denis Rancourt
• “Geo-Economics and Geo-Politics Drive Successive Eras of Predatory Globalization and Social Engineering: Historical emergence of climate change, gender equity, and anti-racism as State doctrines” (Ontario Civil Liberties Association, 2019)
• “Climate Geopolitics and the War-Aversion Obsession of the Western Capitalist/Imperialist Elite” (2026)
• CORRELATION Research in the Public Interest: correlation-canada.org
• Interview: “Interview with Dr. Denis Rancourt: Empire, Mortality, and the Multi-Pronged Attack on Humanity” (Lies are Unbekoming, September 2025)
• Jacob Nordangård
• Rockefeller: Controlling the Game (Skyhorse Publishing, 2024)
• The Pharos Chronicles (Substack): drjacobnordangard.substack.com
• Interview: “Interview with Jacob Nordangård: On Rockefeller, Climate Change, Global Governance, Digital World Brain, Technocratic Dictatorship and much more” (Lies are Unbekoming, August 2024)
Paul Cudenec
• Enemies of the People: The Rothschilds and Their Corrupt Global Empire (Winter Oak, 2022)
• The Great Racket (Winter Oak, 2024)
• Research compiled at winteroak.org.uk
• Interview: “Interview with Paul Cudenec: On Organic Radicalism, Criminocracy, Rothschild, Capture, Withness and much more” (Lies are Unbekoming, August 2024)
ESC
• “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance” (Substack): escapekey.substack.com
• December 2025 documentation of conditional payment infrastructure, including “Velocity,” “Project Sunrise,” “A Conditional Existence,” and the December Omnibus
• Interview: “Interview with esc” (Lies are Unbekoming, July 2025)
Stephen Mitford Goodson
• A History of Central Banking and the Enslavement of Mankind (Black House Publishing, 2014)
Richard C. Cook
• Our Country, Then and Now (2024)
• Former Treasury Department analyst and NASA whistleblower; thirty-two years in the federal government
Kerry Bolton
• Revolution From Above: Manufacturing ‘Dissent’ in the New World Order (Arktos Media, 2011)
Justin M. Ptak
• “Fiat Currency, Monetary Corruption, and the Architecture of Extraction” (Mises Wire, January 2026)
U.S. Department of Energy
• “A Critical Review of Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on the U.S. Climate” (Climate Working Group, July 2025)
Carroll Quigley
• Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (Macmillan, 1966)
Club of Rome
• The First Global Revolution (Alexander King and Bertrand Schneider, 1991)
Simon Linnett
• Trading Emissions: Full Global Potential (The Social Market Foundation, 2008)
